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Abstract
This paper studies investment in cybersecurity, where both the software vendor and the
consumers can invest in security. In addition, the vendor can undertake attack-deterring
and damage-control investments. I show that full liability, under which the vendor is liable
for all damages, does not achieve e ciency and, in particular, the vendor underinvests in
attack deterrence and overinvests in damage control. Instead, the joint use of an optimal
standard, which establishes a minimum compliance framework, and partial liability can
restore e ciency. This suggests that policies that encourage not only firms, but also
consumers to invest in security might be desirable.
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1 Introduction
New security concerns are constantly arising as privacy breaches proliferate and cyber attacks
escalate. For example, a recent data breach on an unprecedented scale saw more than 1.2
billion credentials stolen by a Russian criminal group.1 Moreover, we continue to see the rise of
“ransomware” (a malicious program that encrypts files on the victim’s computer and demands
a fee before unlocking those files), the discovery of security flaws on smartphones, and the emer-
gence of new security risks from the “Internet of Things” (such as hackers stealing sensitive
data from owners of Internet-connected objects—from locks, lights, thermostats, televisions,
⇤I thank Paul Belleflamme, Giacomo Calzolari, Jacques Cre´mer, Vincenzo Denicolo`, Axel Gautier, Domenico
Menicucci, Paul Seabright, anonymous reviewers from the WEIS 2015 conference, and participants at the LCII
and CORE 2015 Digital Economy Workshop, as well as at the seminar at Saint-Louis University Brussels for
their helpful comments. I also acknowledge the support of Toulouse School of Economics and University of
Bologna in earlier versions of this work. Any opinions expressed are those of the author only.
†University of Liege (ULg), HEC Management School, Liege Competition and Innovation Institute (LCII).
E-mail: wingmanwynne.lam@ulg.ac.be
1See “Russia gang hacks 1.2 billion usernames and passwords,” BBC News, August 6 2014, available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28654613.
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refrigerators, washing machines, to cars). A critical gap has thus emerged between firms’ in-
vestment in cybersecurity and today’s rapidly evolving technological advances, which warrants
further research. More particularly, good security depends on more than just the design of the
technology. It requires a deeper understanding of the investment incentives of di↵erent parties.
While software vendors are motivated to minimize their own private costs, the social planner’s
goal is to minimize society’s costs.2 We therefore expect that firms’ incentives to invest are
suboptimal, but it remains an interesting open question of how best to solve the problem.
In the software industry, technologies are never faultless. Firms often undertake investments
in attack prevention and bug fixing sequentially. In the existing literature on bilateral care,
both the firm and the consumers can only engage in one type of precaution to lower the
expected damage. It is important to recognize, however, that multiple types of investments
undertaken by one party will change the conventional result that strict liability with a defense
of contributory negligence, under which the firm is fully liable only if the consumer is not
negligent, yields optimal investment (Brown, 1973). Instead this paper shows that the joint
use of a partial liability regime (or more precisely, the firm bears a fine/reimbursement that
is smaller than consumers’ damage level) and an optimal standard can restore the first-best
outcome. This argument is also consistent with the view taken by some security experts, for
example, Bruce Schneier argued informally that
“100% of the liability should not fall on the shoulders of the software vendor, just
as 100% should not fall on the attacker or the network owner. But today, 100% of
the cost falls directly on the network owner, and that just has to stop.”3
More specifically, a standard is a minimum level of security set by courts or other regula-
tory agencies. In practice, there are di↵erent types of security standards, such as encryption
standards, security breach notification standards, IT continuity standards, set by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Center for Internet Security (CIS) in the
U.S., and more widely by the International Organization for Standards (ISO) and Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). Liability rules state the amount of damage each party is li-
able for, and they are governed by the tort system. For example, consumers may file lawsuits
against firms for security breaches, data leakage, and infringement of privacy, and firms, if
proven they have caused harm or they are negligent in exercising due care (usually a standard
set by courts), will be held accountable for consumer damages. However, it is not clear which
kind of legislation (particularly, standards or liability rules) would better incentivize firms and
consumers to invest in security optimally, whether these interventions should be used jointly
or separately, and which liability regime could lead to socially e cient investments.
This paper presents a formal model for analyzing these questions. I consider a firm that
sells software products, which are subject to potential security problems. The firm can invest
in attack deterrence and damage control to increase security. Considering attack-deterring
2See Anderson, Clayton and Moore (2009), and Anderson and Moore (2009) for surveys of the economics of
Internet security.
3See Schneier (2007). “Information Security and Externalities,” available at https://www.schneier.com/
essays/archives/2007/01/information_security_1.html.
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investments, if, for example, good infiltration detection and authentication technologies are in
place, online attacks (phishing, denial-of-service, virus attacks, among others) can be prevented
in the first place. Damage-control investments are remediation strategies, for example, finding,
testing, and fixing the bug prevents consumers’ data from falling into the wrong hands again. If
the firm discovers the bug, it can choose whether to disclose it or hide it. If the firm discloses the
bug information, consumers can choose whether to take precaution or not. For example, once
a security problem is disclosed, consumers can adopt various defenses (firewalls, cryptographic
protocols, virus detection techniques, intrusion detection systems, data-loss prevention features,
among others) against online attacks. Consumers di↵er in their costs of taking precaution:
actions are more costly for the laymen than for the computer experts. For example, the costs
of taking precautions vary for di↵erent sectors and for di↵erent size of companies. While
financial services, telecommunication sectors, utilities and government departments have far
more resources to hire security professionals to maintain and manage top-notch security tools,
smaller companies in other sectors such as manufacturing and retail have relatively limited
budgets to hire, and hence their engineers may not have a keen understanding about the state-
of-the-art security, which results in higher learning costs than their better trained counterparts.
I find that since the firm does not su↵er the full costs of the society in case of security failure,
its incentives to invest are suboptimal and, in particular, it underinvests in attack deterrence
and overinvests in damage control. I show that there are ine ciencies associated with the
joint use of a full liability rule and an optimal standard to increase security. Interestingly,
switching to a partial liability rule leads to socially e cient investments by both the firm
and the consumers, and this result continues to hold when liability is imposed as a fine to
the regulator and when it is imposed as a reimbursement to the consumers. The important
implications of these results are that the regulator could implement similar standards of security
and privacy as other, already regulated, industries such as automotive and aviation, and put
in place policies that promote the sharing of security investment responsibility between firms
and consumers. Since not all users apply patches immediately after their introduction (e.g.
ordinary computer users may ignore security risk warnings, while enterprise engineers are time
constrained to apply patches and malware-removal tools in a timely manner), there is usually
a gap between the date when a patch is released and when it is adopted. This suggests that
policies that help synchronize patch release and adoption cycles, raise cybersecurity awareness
by sending information to users, and implement third-party vulnerability management could
be useful. I will explore these policy implications in more detail in Section 3.1.
In addition to multiple investments, the presence of network externalities is another impor-
tant feature of the software industry. Considering indirect network externalities, an interesting
corollary of my result is that increasing the number of computer experts improves social wel-
fare, but it exacerbates the under- and over-investment problems when the firm is liable for a
substantial part of the damage. The reason for the latter is that the di↵erence between the
private and social incentives to invest arises from two sources of ine ciency. The first is that
the firm does not pay fully for the damage, and the total amount of damage is decreasing in the
number of experts. The second source of ine ciency is that the firm ignores the precautionary
costs of the consumers when it makes its investment decision, and the total cost of precaution
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is increasing in the number of experts. When the firm bears substantial liability for consumers’
damage, the second source of ine ciency dominates. These results suggest that if the objective
of the government is to improve social welfare, policymakers can provide support and training
in the area of cybersecurity so that users become more competent in managing security threats.
However, if the goal is to alleviate ine ciency, then the government needs to be careful about
increasing the number of experts because the objectives of the social planner and the firm will
become more divergent.
The main contribution of this paper is that it considers three types of investments. As in
traditional bilateral care models in the literature on torts, my model allows both the firm and
the consumer to invest in security in order to lower the expected damage, but in addition,
I introduce two types of investment the firm can undertake, namely, attack deterrence and
damage control. In the software industry, technology is always changing. Firms develop and
release new functionalities quickly. Software products are therefore never free of bugs, and
it is very common to observe multiple rounds of debugging (sequential investments). I show
that such possibility of sequential investments on the part of the firm complemented by a third
precautionary investment on the part of the consumers leads to a new argument supporting
the joint use of a standard and partial liability, under which the firm is only partially liable for
damage caused. The result of a partial liability rule being optimal in this paper parallels the
results in the literature on asymmetric information, which studies how the presence of double
moral hazard problem a↵ects optimal warranty design. When the firm has private information
about its product quality, but such quality is unobservable to consumers, it can use warranties
to signal good quality. However, if firms o↵er full warranties or refunds to consumers, consumers
might not exercise reasonable care, which leads to a double moral hazard problem. Cooper
and Ross (1985) and Belleflamme and Peitz (2010), for instance, show that under double moral
hazard, the optimal warranty calls for partial compensation for a defective product. However,
I show that a partial liability rule supports optimal care even when all investments are publicly
observable (to the firm, the consumers and the courts). That is, the result of a partial rule
being optimal does not require moral hazard. This suggests that the seed of an explanation for
shifting some of the burden of care to the consumers lies in the cost of precautionary actions
of the consumers rather than the presence of moral hazard problem. It is then important for
the regulator to recognize that solving the moral hazard problem is not su cient to restore
investment e ciency. Instead, the regulator should focus on the design of policies that share
the burden of care between the software vendor and the consumers. Furthermore, I show that
introducing three types of investments may lead to “vaporware” practice even in the absence
of preemptive motives and reputation concerns: because attack-deterring and damage-control
investments are substitutes, allowing firms to fix security problem later increases the likelihood
of releasing a less secure software product in the first place—a new perspective in the vaporware
literature.
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1.1 Literature
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it is related to recent works on
the economics of security investment. Gordon and Loeb (2002) study the optimal protection
of information, which varies with the information set’s vulnerability.4 Kunreuther and Heal
(2003), August and Tunca (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2013), and Riordan (2014) study investment
incentives in the presence of network externalities. My model di↵ers from these papers in
that they consider each firm taking one action, whereas the firm in this paper can undertake
both attack-deterring and damage-control investments. Varian (2004) examines full liability
in a model in which e↵orts of multiple parties are needed to increase security. He finds that
liability should be assigned entirely to the party who can best manage the risk. Di↵erent
from his analysis, I also consider partial liability, and the joint e↵ect of partial liability and
standards.
Second, this paper relates to the economics and legal literature on tort laws, but it departs
from traditional bilateral care models (see, for instance, Brown, 1973; Shavell, 1980; Landes
and Posner, 1985; and Daughety and Reinganum, 2013a), in which both the firm and the
consumer can lower the expected damage by their choices of care, by introducing three types
of investments.5 More specifically, in their models each party can take one type of care, whereas
in my model the firm can invest in attack deterrence and damage control, and additionally the
consumer can take precautionary action. Modeling in this way, I find that a partial liability rule
yields the socially e cient outcome, which di↵ers from what is found in Brown (1973).6 I will
explain the sources of the di↵erence in results in Section 3. There is also some literature that
focuses on either attack-deterring investment, as in Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2006), or
damage-control investment, as in Polinsky and Shavell (2010);7 rather than dealing with both.
Other papers such as Shavell (1984) and Kolstad et al. (1990) compare standards with liability
rules. However, Shavell’s analysis is based on the ine ciencies associated with the potential
bankruptcy of the firm and the uncertainty of lawsuit by the consumers, while the ine ciencies
studied by Kolstad et al. are due to the uncertainty over the legal standard to which the firm
will be held liable. Di↵erently, ine ciencies here are caused by the firm having the possibility
to undertake two types of investments.
Finally, this paper shares with the literature on disclosure laws (see, for example, Granick
4There are other security investment models in computer science (for a survey, see Bo¨hme, 2010), which,
for instance, investigate questions about the appropriate amount of security budgets (i.e. how much to invest)
and firms’ security investment strategies (i.e. when and where to invest). However, they do not tackle the
investment problem from the legal and economic perspectives, meaning that the e↵ects of security standards
and liability policies on investment incentives (i.e. what measures should the regulator implement) have been
largely ignored in this literature.
5See Shavell (2008) and Daughety and Reinganum (2013b) for excellent surveys of the literature on torts.
6Since I do not consider usage in this model, Shavell (1980) and Landes and Posner (1985), who study
proportional-harm model (meaning the e↵ect of harm is linear on usage), and Daughety and Reinganum (2013a),
who focus on cumulative-harm model (meaning the e↵ect of harm is non-linear on usage), are not the primary
point of comparison with this model.
7Polinsky and Shavell analyze information acquisition about product risks when product quality is uncertain.
Therefore, their problem concerns damage-control, rather than attack-deterring, investment.
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(2005) and Choi et al. (2010a)) the focus on the tradeo↵ that arises from disclosing software
vulnerabilities: while secrecy prevents attackers from taking advantage of publicized security
flaws, it interferes with scientific advancement in security, which is largely based on information
sharing and cooperation. Choi et al. also examine the e↵ect of a mandatory disclosure policy
and a “bug bounty” program on welfare. However, they take security investments as given,
and do not discuss optimal investment. Daughety and Reinganum (2005) study the e↵ect of
confidential settlement on product safety, but their focus is not on investment. This paper
extends this literature by analyzing the optimal investment in security, and such investment is
of two types: attack deterrence and damage control.
2 The Model
Monopoly software vendor. Consider a firm that produces a software product which contains
potential bugs. For simplicity, I assume away prices, so that the problem is simplified to
choosing a level of security that minimizes the sum of the costs. The assumption is reasonable
for consumers who have already bought the software and are therefore not concerned about
the prices. Moreover, if the firm generates profit from channels other than selling the software
product such as advertisement, then the objective is simply to minimize the costs.
Heterogeneous consumers. There is a unit mass of consumers. Consumers have di↵erent
precaution costs: a proportion ↵ of them are “computer experts” and have precaution cost  
drawn from a distribution F ( ) ⇠ [0,+1), while the others are “laymen” with   = 1. The
firm knows F ( ), but cannot observe each consumer’s type. Experts are security professionals
who can take security precautions such as monitoring the system for attacks and patching
the system if the firm discloses the presence of a security problem, while laymen without
such professional knowledge will never take precautions.8 Assume that consumers always have
positive utility in using the software.
In the main text, there are two types of consumers: all experts have the same   and all
laymen have an infinite cost. However, in the alternative model presented in Appendix A, I
consider a continuum of consumers whose precautionary cost   is distributed according to F ( )
(with a slight abuse of notations). However, this would not change my main results.
Timing of the game. (i) The firm invests s in security at a cost c(s) in order to prevent
attacks. Such investment could take the form of improvement in infiltration detection or
authentication technologies. (ii) By investing m(b) in damage control, the firm will find a bug
before the hacker does with probability b.9 Let p(s) be the probability that the hacker will
attack. I assume away strategic attacks.10 (iii) If the firm discovers a bug, it can choose whether
8I assume that consumers take precaution after the firm has disclosed the information about the bug. One
could alternatively think of consumers taking precaution ex ante. However, the qualitative result will not
change as long as the costs associated with these precautions are not borne by the firm.
9Whether the firm chooses s and b sequentially or simultaneously does not a↵ect the results, but in prac-
tice attack deterrence and damage control usually happen sequentially. The novelty is to have two types of
investments on the part of the firm.
10Strategic attacks are modeled in, for instance, Acemoglu et al. (2013). They show that strategic targeting
provides additional incentives for overinvestment in security because larger investment shifts attacks from one
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or not to disclose the security problem. There is no cost in disclosing the bug. For example,
the firm can simply post the information on its website. However, disclosure increases the
probability of attack by a small ✏.11 (iv)   is realized. If the firm discloses a bug, the experts
can choose whether or not to take precaution.
Assumption 1. c0(0) = 0, c0(s) > 0, c00(s) > 0, c000(s) > 0,m0(0) = 0,m0(b) > 0,m00(b) >
0,m000(b) > 0, p0(s) < 0, and p00(s) > 0.
Under Assumption 1, investment costs c(s) and m(b) are thrice di↵erentiable, convex, and
increasing in s and b respectively; and that probability of attack p(s) is convex and decreasing
in s.12 13 This model assumes that all investments are publicly observable. In reality, regu-
lators and courts can monitor safety investments more easily in some cases (especially when
it leads to lawsuits) compared to others. However, I chose not to model moral hazard in the
firm’s incentives to invest because this set-up allows me to highlight the source of investment
ine ciency comes from the presence of consumers’ precautionary costs rather than the moral
hazard problem itself, which suggests that policies that merely get rid of the moral hazard
problem is not enough to restore e ciency.
Damage. For the firm, the damage incurred from an attack is ⌘ in case the hacker discovers
the bug before the firm does, and ⌘ in case the firm identifies the bug first. Assume that ⌘ > ⌘.
This could be the financial losses and reputational harm caused by stolen information of the
firm becoming available to the hacker. Such loss is smaller if the firm finds the bug first as it can
then try to fix the problem. However, the firm may face substantial loss if the hacker exploits a
bug that has not been previously identified—a phenomenon known as “zero-day attacks”. For
the consumers, the damage from an attack is µ if they do not take precaution and µ if they
do. This could be monetary loss due to fraudulent use of their personal information. Assume
that µ > µ, meaning once informed, consumers can take actions to mitigate the risk of being
attacked. Let   2 [0, 1] denote the part of consumers’ damages for which the firm is liable.
In reality, liability can be imposed as a fine paid by the firm to the regulator, in which case
the fine does not a↵ect consumers’ precautionary behavior, or liability can be imposed as a
reimbursement to the consumers, in which case the refund does a↵ect consumers’ precautionary
behavior. For example, fines are common in the IT industry. Regulatory bodies such as the
British Information Commissioner’s O ce can issue fines to firms that breach the UK Data
Protection Act. Companies such as Sony and eBay have historically been fined for a breach
of the Act. Another example is AT&T’s recent data breaches that took place in 2013 and
2014 at three of its international call centers. This has led to a $25 million fine, which is the
agent to another.
11Arora, Nandkumar and Telang (2006) show empirically that in some cases vulnerability disclosure increases
the frequency of attacks.
12The third derivatives ensure that the profit function is well-behaved.
13If there are externalities between the two cost functions, meaning investing more in attack deterrence
will make finding bugs easier, then there will be more investment in attack deterrence under both optimal
and equilibrium regimes because of the cost reduction in damage control. However, it will not change the
qualitative result that partial liability rule supports optimal investment, provided the firm does not take into
account consumer’s precautionary cost when choosing its investments.
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largest penalty the Federal Communications Commission has ever imposed on a company for
data security and privacy violations.14 Reimbursements, however, are more common in finance.
Many banks, for instance, guarantee zero liability for unauthorized online transactions, meaning
consumers are reimbursed for all financial losses originating from identity theft. As another
example, Target will reimburse victims of its data breach that occurred in 2013, which has
resulted in the theft of at least 40 million credit card numbers.15 In other industries and in
general, fines are more applicable to cases where it is di cult for consumers to file lawsuits
(for instance, because of the triviality of the security breach or the lack of financial resources
to go against big firms), so that the firm cannot identify the victims of the attack to o↵er a
refund. The basic model considers the case with fine, while Section 4.3 considers the case with
reimbursement. Nevertheless, I show that the main result of Proposition 2 (below) that the
partial liability rule yields the socially e cient outcome would not change under reimbursement.
I focus on three liability regimes:16
• Full liability, under which the firm is liable for all damages faced by the consumers,
i.e.   = 1;
• Partial liability, under which the firm is partially liable for consumers’ damages, i.e.   2
(0, 1);
• No liability, under which the firm is not liable for consumers’ damages, i.e.   = 0.
Thus, the total loss for the firm is ⌘ +  µ, where ⌘ 2 [⌘, ⌘] and µ 2 [µ, µ].
Regulatory policies. The regulator can set the minimal security standard, s, but cannot
regulate directly the probability of finding a bug, b, which is di cult to predict in practice
as b depends on the constantly evolving technologies of both the hackers and the defenders.
Because of these unpredictable changes, the regulator chooses the optimal liability rule instead
of b. A striking result is that partial liability is optimal as opposed to full liability emphasized
in tort models, yielding interesting policy implications, which I will discuss in Section 3.1.
14See “AT&T pays record $25m fine over customer data thefts,” BBC News, April 9 2015, available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32232604.
15See “Target to pay $10m to settle lawsuit over data breach,” BBC News, March 19 2015, available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31963612.
16The legal literature uses other terminologies, for instance, they call the situation wherein a firm must fully
compensate a consumer for harm caused “strict liability” instead of “full liability”; the situation wherein a firm
is liable only if the consumer is not negligent “strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence”; and
the situation wherein a negligent firm is only partially liable if the consumer is also negligent “comparative
negligence”.17 However, much of the legal literature focuses on the first two rules, but rarely discusses the role
of partial liability.
I adopt slightly di↵erent terminologies to disentangle the e↵ect of two instruments—standards and liability
rules—because in practice they are usually implemented by separate regulatory agencies. For example, rather
than one court or agency making a centralized decision altogether, we have the tort system governing the
circumstances under which a party is liable for damages caused, and other regulatory agencies setting standards.
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3 Optimal Investment
I now work backward from the last stage. When the firm discloses a bug, the expected damage
for a consumer who does not take precaution is p(s)µ, and that for a consumer who takes
precaution is p(s)µ+  . Therefore, the consumer will take precaution if
  < p(s)(µ  µ). (1)
In the disclosure stage, the firm can choose its disclosure policy in case it discovers a
bug. If it does not disclose the security problem, its expected cost is p(s)(⌘ +  µ). If it
chooses to disclose, there are two cases. If consumers take precaution, the firm incurs a cost of
p(s)[⌘ +  (↵µ + (1   ↵)µ)]. However, if consumers do not take precaution, the cost becomes
p(s)(⌘+ µ).18 Therefore, the firm will only disclose if this leads consumers to take precaution,
that is, if Equation (1) holds.
In the investment stage, the firm chooses s and b to minimize its expected loss, which is
denoted by Lf .
min
b,s
Lf = (1  b)p(s)(⌘ +  µ)
+ b
(Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
p(s)[⌘ +  (↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ)]dF ( ) +
Z 1
p(s)(µ µ)
p(s)(⌘ +  µ)dF ( )
)
+m(b) + c(s). (2)
Let bm(s) denote the firm’s optimal damage-control investment strategy given attack-deterring
investment s, and let s⇤ and b⇤ ⌘ bm(s⇤) denote the solutions of Equation (2).
The first term in Equation (2) is the expected cost of the firm when the hacker discovers
the bug first, in which case both the firm and the consumers su↵er a large damage. When
the firm finds the bug before the hacker, either it discloses the bug if consumers’ cost is small,
which is captured by the second term, or it does not disclose if consumers’ cost is large, which is
captured by the third term. In this case, the firm su↵ers a small damage from attack because it
identifies the bug sooner than the hacker, while the extent of damages su↵ered by the consumers
depends on whether precautionary measures are taken. The last two terms represent the costs
of attack-deterring and damage-control investments.
The social planner’s incentive to disclose is aligned with that of the firm, that is, the social
planner will disclose as long as   is small enough.19 However, di↵erent from the firm, if the
social planner chooses to disclose, its expected cost is p(s)(⌘ + ↵µ + (1   ↵)µ) + ↵ , which
is higher than that of the firm. This is because the social planner also takes into account
consumers’ cost of taking precautions (↵ ) when choosing the socially e cient investments.
18When consumers do not take precaution, the firm would strictly prefer not to disclose because disclosure
would increase the probability of attack by ✏.
19The disclosure stage is not critical to my analysis because the firm’s private incentive to disclose is aligned
with social incentive to disclose, but including the disclosure stage is meant to highlight the robustness and
general nature of my results. An open question for future research is how, under moral hazard, firm’s disclosure
decision could signal its e↵ort about security investments.
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Moreover, the social planner internalizes all the society’s costs, so there is no liability issue. In
case of non-disclosure, the expected cost is p(s)(⌘ + µ).
The social planner chooses s and b to minimize the expected loss of the society, which is
denoted by LSP .
min
b,s
LSP =(1  b)p(s)(⌘ + µ) + b
(Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
[p(s)(⌘ + ↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ) + ↵ ]dF ( )
+
Z 1
p(s)(µ µ)
p(s)(⌘ + µ)dF ( )
)
+m(b) + c(s)
=Lf | =1 + b↵
Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
 dF ( ). (3)
Let bSP (s) denote the social planner’s optimal damage-control investment strategy given attack-
deterring investment s, and let so and bo ⌘ bSP (so) denote the solutions of Equation (3).
The di↵erence between Lf and LSP is that the firm minimizes its own private costs, while
the social planner minimizes the sum of firm’s and consumers’ costs.
Lemma 1. Under full liability (  = 1), bm(s) and bSP (s) decrease with s.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 shows that the firm has less incentive to find bugs given a high security level for
attack deterrence, meaning that attack-deterring and damage-control investments are substi-
tutes.
Lemma 2. Under full liability (  = 1), bm(s) > bSP (s) for all s. In particular, if the standard
is set at the socially optimal level, s⇤ = so, the firm will overinvest in damage control, bm(so) >
bSP (so).
Proof. See Appendix C.
One might expect that under full liability and an optimal standard the firm will invest
optimally, but it turns out di↵erently when consumers also bear some costs in protecting their
computers. The intuition runs as follows. If a bug is not found, both the firm and the society
su↵er the same magnitude of heavy losses because hackers can exploit a bug fully before
it is patched by developers and since the bug is not identified, consumers cannot take any
precautionary actions to reduce damage. If a bug is discovered, the firm su↵ers less damage
than the social planner because once a problem is disclosed consumers can employ various
defenses against online attacks. However, since the firm decides on the amount of investment
to minimize its own private costs, it will ignore the precautionary costs on the part of consumers,
whereas the social planner minimizes the sum of these costs. Because the firm has more to
gain in finding bugs, it will overinvest with respect to the socially e cient level.
I assume that full liability is defined for “net” damages to the consumers. One can alter-
natively define it for “total” damages, which includes also consumers’ precaution cost. In this
case, full liability alone is enough to restore the first-best. I model the liability regime the
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way I did because in practice, firms are typically liable for financial damages to the consumers
caused by, for example, a data breach. Liability sometimes also covers for litigation costs,20
but very rarely for investment costs in precaution. One di culty lies in estimating the amount
of time and e↵ort consumers spent on managing, maintaining and patching a system.
Proposition 1. (Full Liability with Fines). Under full liability (  = 1), under which the firm
must pay a fine to the regulator for all the damages caused, the firm underinvests in attack
deterrence, s⇤ < so, and overinvests in damage control, b⇤ > bo.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 1 shows that full liability alone does not achieve the first-best solution. The
reason is that, as shown in Lemma 2, the firm has more to gain in finding the bug than
the social planner, and hence it invests too much in damage control. The firm invests too
little in attack deterrence because it expects to overinvest in damage control, as was shown in
Lemma 1. Furthermore, in Appendix F, I show that if liability regime is the only instrument
of public policies, neither liability regime (full, partial or zero) is not enough to provide the
right incentives for two investments.
Proposition 2. (Partial Liability). The socially optimal level of investment, so and bo, can be
achieved with the joint use of an optimal standard so and a partial liability rule   2 (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix E.
When security standards are set at the socially optimal level, it is ine cient to implement
full liability because the firm will overinvest in damage control; it is also ine cient to set firm’s
liability to zero because it will then underinvest in damage control. As a consequence, the
optimal liability rule is a partial one.
This result is related to Brown’s (1973) work on bilateral care model, wherein he finds
that “strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence” (i.e. the firm is strictly liable
unless the consumer is negligent) supports the socially e cient outcome. Although a direct
comparison with his model is di cult because I did not model negligence explicitly,21 it would
be useful to understand why di↵erent rules lead to optimality. More particularly, I find that
strict liability, with and without a standard, do not achieve e ciency, but instead partial
liability and an optimal standard do, both for the cases with fine (this section) and with
reimbursement (Section 4.3). The main di↵erence between this model and Brown’s model
is that in Brown’s model both parties (the firm and the consumer) choose one type of care,
20Incorporating litigations in the model would not change my qualitative results since in the alternative model
the expected damage faced by consumers will change from µ to the probability of losing the litigation times µ,
whereas the firm’s expected liability will become its probability of losing the litigation times   times µ; all that
matters is the magnitude.
21Negligence is not the main focus of my model because it is generally less costly for the courts to define a
negligence system when the firm can undertake one type of investment compared to the case with two types
of investments. Since in the latter case, the firm may be negligent in deterring attacks, in reducing damage or
in both. It would then be di cult to define whether the firm should be judged negligent if it violates one due
care standard but meets the other one.
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whereas in this model one party (the firm) chooses two types of care. In his model, under
strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, both parties will exert the right level
of care. Because the firm is liable for all losses sustained by consumers, it is led to choose the
correct level of care. Moreover, consumers, knowing that they have to bear their losses if they
are negligent (meaning that they fail to meet the due care standard), will also exercise due
care. However, with one more type of investment on firm’s side, I find that the joint use of full
liability and an optimal standard would generate ine cient investments for reasons discussed
before (see Lemma 2).
3.1 Policy Implications: standards and partial liability
Proposition 2 shows that security can be improved with the joint use of an optimal standard and
a partial liability rule. For standards, they can either be implemented by the legal system as
negligence rules, under which the party who does not comply with the due care standard chosen
by courts will be penalized, or by a separate regulatory agency. Such agency can establish
minimum standards for IT security (such as a mandatory compliance framework in encryption
and security breach notification) as other already regulated industries like automotive and
aviation, where new models of car and aircraft must pass some safety tests conducted by
international or national regulatory bodies before they are allowed on the road or in the air.
As for liability rules, the system of tort law can implement them. I find that, given an
optimal standard, shifting some liability to the consumers is welfare improving. This means
that the regulator should not impose a one hundred percent liability on the software vendor
because this will distort its investment incentives. Instead, an e↵ective policy is to ask both
the software vendor and its customers to share the costs of security.22
On individual level, despite the fact that users dislike or feel concerned about security
problems, many of them do not take appropriate care to prevent insecurity: they ignore breach
notification letters, they do not patch their machines, and use simple passwords. In the case
of ChoicePoint’s data breach, for instance, more than 90% of the customers whose personal
information had been stolen did not take up the mitigating solutions (such as free credit
monitoring service and insurance) proposed by ChoicePoint.23 One reason for this may be that
consumers have other competing demands on their time, and paying attention to security advice
appears to be low on their priority list. Thus, it seems reasonable to promote cybersecurity
awareness among home users so they will begin to take more precautions to protect themselves.
As another example, because of the hassle of remembering strong and multiple passwords, many
users use easy-to-remember passwords and reuse the same credentials across websites. Thus,
another way to incentivize users to change their behavior is to promote the development and
22Although this discussion interprets costs of security as a form of liability, they are di↵erent from the costs
explained by   in that consumers ignoring or not noticing security alerts is not an investment, but rather it
shows a systematic lack of security consciousness. This raises the question of who should be responsible for the
damages that arise from such negligence.
23See Jon Brodkin, “Victims of ChoicePoint Data Breach Didn’t Take Advantage of Free O↵ers,” Network
World, April 10, 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/041007-choicepoint-victim-offers.
html?page=1.
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the adoption of password managers, which can generate and store unique passwords, thereby
saving on users’ hassle costs.
On enterprise level, installing patches could be time- and resource-consuming, especially
for large companies, because the plethora of security updates can often overwhelm software
engineers, who have to keep track of all relevant bugs and patches, and match the version of
all those updates to versions of software their company is using. Once a problem is identified,
they need to figure out which updates get priority, and look for solutions to deal with it.24 As
a consequence, few companies can apply updates in a timely manner, which easily leads to the
missing of some major security problems. This suggests that a desirable policy should try to
eliminate the delay in applying the solutions to security problems. First, the government could
persuade or mandate the users to react more quickly (for example, within a predetermined
window of time) as soon as the vendor makes the solutions available and notifies them in a
reasonable way. Second, third parties can be introduced to help enterprises to find, select and
deploy the solutions that are relevant to their systems. For example, using the cloud computing
technology, firms could outsource security activities to external providers by moving part of
the business processes to the cloud. Qualys, Inc., a vulnerability management company that
helps businesses to adhere to compliance and security standards in the IT and financial sectors,
provides another example.
3.2 Network Externality
In this subsection, I consider direct and indirect network e↵ects in turn. Direct network e↵ects
are common in cybersecurity because one compromised system may a↵ect many other users,
for example, attackers can steal millions of credit card details from a compromised e-commerce
website or they can use the infected system to host phishing sites, distribute spam e-mails or
other unlawful content. Kunreuther and Heal (2003), August and Tunca (2006), Acemoglu et
al. (2013), and Riordan (2014), for instance, examine agents’ incentive to invest in security
in the presence of network externalities. While they focus on one type of security investment,
this paper deals with two types.25
In the previous analysis, I have assumed that there are no direct network e↵ects, but
my qualitative results would not change even if we add this. Re-interpreting damage-control
investment as a patch release and consumers’ action as the choice of patch installation, direct
24Practitioners have commonly considered patch management as a time- and resource-consuming
activity. See “Automating Patch Management,” Symantec, February 8, 2005, available at
http://www.symantec.com/articles/article.jsp?aid=automating_patch_management. On average,
firms spend 600 hours per week on the malware containment process. See “Four in five malware
alerts are a ‘waste of time’,” ZDNet, January 19, 2015, available at http://www.zdnet.com/article/
businesses-waste-1-3m-a-year-on-false-malware-alarms/?tag=nl.e552&s_cid=e552&ttag=e552&
ftag=TRE3e6936e.
25More particularly, August and Tunca (2006) focus on the problem of patch management, and therefore
consider damage-control investment only. Security investments are strategic complements in Kunreuther and
Heal (2003), strategic substitutes in Acemoglu et al. (2013), and can be strategic complements or strategic
substitutes in Riordan (2014) depending on whether the attacks are direct or indirect, but agents can only
invest once in these models.
13
network e↵ects between consumers could arise when consumers who do not patch increase the
security risks on other consumers, and consumers who patch reduce the probability of others
being attacked. In this case, increasing the proportion of experts ↵ will lower the damage
to all experts, µ, and that to all laymen, µ, meaning only magnitude changes. However, the
main qualitative result of liability-sharing between the firm and the consumers remains valid,
provided consumers have to take precautionary actions.
Indirect network e↵ects exist as well because the software vendor’s investment strategy is
a↵ected by the proportion of consumers taking precaution. In this model, ↵ can be interpreted
as a measure of indirect network e↵ect.
Corollary 1. (Indirect network e↵ects). When   is large, increasing the proportion of computer
experts, ↵, exacerbates underinvestment in attack deterrence and overinvestment in damage
control.
Proof. See Appendix G.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 runs as follows. Comparing Equations (2) with (3), for a
given s the di↵erence between the private and social incentives to invest that is related to ↵
arises from the following.
p(s) (1   )(↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ)| {z }
distortion from liability assignment
+ ↵ |{z}
distortion from consumers0 costs
.
Investment incentives are distorted by two forces: first, the firm does not pay fully for the
damage; second, the firm ignores the precautionary costs of the consumers when it makes its
investment decision. If the firm is held liable for a large proportion of damage (i.e.   is large),
then reducing the proportion of experts (↵) mitigates suboptimal investment incentives. The
reason is that an increase in firm’s liability reduces the first type of distortion, whereas a
decrease in the proportion of experts reduces the second type of distortion. Taking the e↵ects
together, the objectives of the social planner and the firm become more aligned, and thus a
decrease in ↵ reduces the extent that the firm is investing suboptimally.26
As for social welfare, it is easy to see from Equation (3) that an increase in the proportion
of experts leads to a decrease in society’s loss. This suggests that if the primary objective of
the government is to improve social welfare, policymakers can provide support and training in
the area of cybersecurity so that users become more competent in managing security threats.
For example, many security breaches involve attackers trying to compromise users’ accounts,
and users are sometimes unaware of such attack. Even if they are aware of the attack, they
sometimes lack the skills needed to resolve the security problem. Cisco forecasted that there
will be a global shortage of IT security professionals that are needed to cope with cyber threats
in both public and private sectors.27 Therefore, increasing training that aims at enhancing
26If   is small, the firm, knowing that they are only liable for a small part of the damage, may underinvest
in both attack deterrence and damage control. The e↵ect of ↵ is then di cult to generalize because it depends
on not only  , but also s⇤, so, b⇤ and bo.
27See “Cybersecurity’s hiring crisis: A troubling trajectory,” ZDNet, August 25 2014, avail-
able at http://www.zdnet.com/cybersecuritys-hiring-crisis-a-troubling-trajectory-7000032923/
?s_cid=e552&ttag=e552&ftag=TRE3e6936e.
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specific engineering skills of these users appears to be appropriate, provided that the training
costs are not too large. Further, earlier intervention before young people enter the labor
market might be appropriate. The government in the UK, for instance, is trying to improve
the IT curriculum at all levels of education to address IT skills shortages.28 At primary and
secondary levels, the Raspberry Pi, which is a bare-bones computer developed in the UK by the
Raspberry Pi Foundation, improves the coding incentives of young students by giving them the
opportunity to learn how to write the code that makes the software work rather than learning
how to use the software created by other engineers. At university level, schools o↵er more
master classes and on-the-job practical trainings in computer science.29 This kind of policy
makes sense if the government’s aim is to enhance welfare. However, if the goal is to alleviate
investment ine ciency, the government needs to be careful about increasing the number of
experts because the objectives of the social planner and the firm would further diverge. That
being said, this does not mean that o↵ering cybersecurity training is undesirable (e.g. it could
potentially generate cost savings for firms through detecting, defending against and recovering
from cyber-attacks), but that the potential adverse e↵ects on incentives should not be ignored.
4 Discussion
This section discusses alternative interpretations of this model and, in particular, how the
underinvestment and overinvestment results can be used to explain real-world security issues
in IT and in other industries where firms undertake two investments, and how to address these
issues by implementing alternative policies, such as reimbursing consumers instead of imposing
fines.
4.1 Vaporware
“Vaporware” refers to the software industry practice of announcing new products well in ad-
vance of their actual release on the market.30 The previous literature, for instance, Bayus et al.
(2001) and Haan (2003), studies how such product pre-announcements can be used as a means
of entry deterrence in a signaling model. Choi et al. (2010b) examine how reputation concerns
may induce firms to make honest announcements in a repeated cheap-talk game. Although
vaporware practice typically means the release dates of the products are much later than the
original announced dates, we could alternatively view the announced product as a product
characteristics (a security feature, for instance) instead of the physical product. Vaporware
could then be interpreted as delivering a lower-quality product compared to the standard set
by some regulatory agencies or bodies of law, which is consistent with the current development
in the industry: software firms often “experiment” the alpha versions of their products (e.g.
28See “UK recovery ’constrained’ by lack of engineers,” BBC News, November 4 2014, available at http:
//www.bbc.com/news/education-24779016.
29See “Degree apprenticeships launched to boost hi-tech skills,” BBC News, November 26 2014, available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/education-30193095.
30Vaporware may also mean the announced products never reach the market, but this is not the focus of this
paper because the firm always introduces the product in this model.
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software, mobile applications, and smart-home appliances) in public and release improved beta
versions at a later date. Thus, alpha versions of many software products are susceptible to
security risks. The result of underinvestment in attack deterrence in this model captures the
essence of this situation. Moreover, I show that vaporware practice (underinvestment in attack
deterrence/the release of lower quality software) is in fact a profit-maximizing strategy for the
firm, and it may occur even in the absence of preemptive motives and reputation concerns.
This is therefore di↵erent from the vaporware literature, where firms engage in vaporware only
to prevent entry or when reputational concern is not so important. The new insight here is that
the possibility of sequential investments, which allows the firm also to fix security problems
later, provides an alternative explanation at least in part for vaporware practice in the software
market.
4.2 More General Applications
The analysis also provides insight into other industries in which sequential investments are
important, such as automobiles. We can then re-interpret the seller as a firm that produces
a product with some safety features. There are again two types of investments the firm can
undertake: first investment in pre-sale product design and second investment in post-sale
remedial measures. For example, the pre-sale investment could lead to the development of a
new technology in cars that is subject to potential safety defect. After sale, the firm can invest
in remedying these safety problems. It is, for instance, common to observe product recalls
because of problems in engines or braking in the car industry. Note that, however, in the car
industry, there is generally a stricter compliance framework for producers compared to the
software industry, and thus vaporware, the practice of announcing a product well in advance
of its actual release, is less of an issue.
Other examples include employers making the first investment in safety technology that
reduces risks at workplace and prevents injuries of their employees, and the second investment
in fixing any problems arising from actual injuries and replacing equipment that is worn out
with usage; firms building a factory that may generate harm (e.g. pollution and radiation) to
residents who live nearby, and they have to first decide on the amount of precautions to take in
factory design and then decide on the level of care it takes in regular inspection of the facility.
With these re-interpretations, this model would be useful for studying investment incentives
of di↵erent parties, in particular whether there are incorrect incentives to deter the occurrence
of harm and to reduce damage on the part of the injurer, and to take precautionary action on
the part of potential victims, as well as how to correct them.
4.3 Reimbursement
Up to now, we have interpreted liability as a fine, which does not a↵ect consumer’s precaution-
ary behavior. Now suppose that the firm, instead of paying a fine to courts for a proportion  
of the damage, is required to reimburse consumers an amount specified by one of the liability
regimes. Let ⇢ denote the refund that returns to the pockets of consumers, which can be equal
to or smaller than consumers’ damage level. I show that
16
Proposition 3. (Full Liability with Reimbursements). Under full refund (⇢ = 1), under which
the firm must reimburse fully to a consumer for damage caused, the firm overinvests in attack
deterrence, s⇤ > so, and underinvests in damage control, b⇤ < bo.
Proof. See Appendix H.
Under full reimbursement, if a bug is not found, both the firm and the society su↵er the
same loss. However, if a bug is found, consumers, knowing that they will be fully reimbursed
anyway, have no incentive to take precaution in equilibrium, whereas under social optimum
some consumers (the experts in particular) will take precaution when the benefit of an increase
in precautionary action outweighs the cost. The benefit of investing in b for the firm is therefore
lower compared to that of the social planner. Consequently, the firm underinvests in damage
control. And since attack-deterring and damage-control investments are substitutes, the firm
overinvests in attack deterrence.
The banking sector is a case in point. Financial institutions invest a large amount of money
in developing new technologies that defend their consumers against password theft, but much
less in damage reduction because tracing suspicious money transfers from one bank account to
another is relatively easier than preventing password-stealing attacks in the first place.
It is also straightforward to show Proposition 2 remains valid in the case with reimburse-
ment. Although di↵erent instruments (a fine or a reimbursement) yields di↵erent investment
incentives, in both cases a partial liability rule results in the socially e cient outcome. This
suggests that when both the firm and the consumers can invest in security and the firm can
undertake two types of investments, it would be useful for policymakers to think about passing
some liability to consumers instead of adopting either full or zero liability rules, and about
whether a fine or a reimbursement is the more appropriate regulatory instrument.
5 Conclusion
More and more devices, such as mobile phones, home appliances, health devices, cars, and
even some infrastructures (e.g. tra c lights), become Internet connected, but we continue to
discover security failures, including malware (e.g. ransomware, chargeware and adware), poor
encryption and backdoors that allow unauthorized access. This paper suggests that to increase
security, the key is not so much about holding the seller of these devices solely liable for the
loss, but balancing the investment incentives between the firm and the consumers.
In practice, there are few policies regulating the software industry compared to financial ser-
vices and transportation. Establishing national or international regulatory body to implement
security standards for Internet-connected devices and updating existing regulations to ensure
that only products with adequate defenses against attacks can be released on the market could
represent a useful start. For example, Finland has passed a new legislation, the “Information
Society Code”, at the beginning of 2015, which enforces security standards on a wide range of
platforms such as Apple, Facebook and Twitter.
In future work, it would be interesting to relax the single-firm assumption and study compe-
tition between software vendors. The possibility of interdependencies between software prod-
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ucts may lead to interesting dynamics between firms, and investment incentives may be di↵er-
ent depending on whether firms’ investments are substitutes. Alternatively, one could study
contagion issues in a network of multiple firms.31
Appendices
A Continuum of Consumers
With a slight abuse of the notation, suppose that there is a continuum of consumers whose
precaution cost   is drawn from a distribution F ( ) ⇠ [0,+1). As before, consumers will take
precaution if   < p(s)(µ   µ), and the marginal consumer, who is indi↵erent between taking
and not taking precaution, is given by  (s) ⌘ p(s)(µ  µ).
If the firm does not disclose the bug, its expected cost is p(s)(⌘ +  µ); if it discloses the
bug, it expected cost is p(s)[⌘+ (F ( (s))µ+(1 F ( (s)))µ)]. Since the latter is smaller than
the former, the firm will always disclose. Therefore, the firm chooses s and b to minimize
min
b,s
Lf = (1  b)p(s)(⌘+  µ) + bp(s)[⌘+  (F ( (s))µ+ (1 F ( (s)))µ)] +m(b) + c(s). (A.1)
As for the social planner, the cost for non-disclosure is p(s)(⌘ + µ), whereas the cost for
disclosure is p(s)[⌘ + F ( (s))µ + (1   F ( (s)))µ] + R  (s)0  dF ( ). Since the latter is smaller
than the former, the social planner will always disclose. The social planner therefore solves
min
b,s
LSP = (1  b)p(s)(⌘ + µ)
+ b
(
p(s)[⌘ + F ( (s))µ+ (1  F ( (s)))µ] +
Z  (s)
0
 dF ( )
)
+m(b) + c(s). (A.2)
It is easy to see that since
R  (s)
0  dF ( ) > 0, LSP > Lf for any  . Thus, the main results
of underinvestment in attack deterrence and overinvestment in damage control carry through.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Since   = 1, the first-order conditions with respect to b are given by
@LSP
@b
= 0,
, m0(b) = p(s)(⌘ + µ) 
Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
[p(s)(⌘ + ↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ) + ↵ ]dF ( )| {z }
GSP (s)
 
Z 1
p(s)(µ µ)
p(s)(⌘ + µ)dF ( ), (B.1)
31See, for instance, Morris (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2013), and Goyal et al. (2014) for treatment of contagion
in networks.
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and
@Lf
@b
= 0,
, m0(b) = p(s)(⌘ + µ) 
Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
p(s)(⌘ + ↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ)dF ( )| {z }
Gf (s)
 
Z 1
p(s)(µ µ)
p(s)(⌘ + µ)dF ( ). (B.2)
The right hand sides of Equations (B.1) and (B.2) are decreasing in s.
C Proof of Lemma 2
We can see from Equations (B.1) and (B.2) that if s⇤ = so, then Gf (so) < GSP (so). Thus,
bm(so) > bSP (so).
D Proof of Proposition 1
Since   = 1, the first-order conditions with respect to s are given by
@LSP
@s
= 0,
,   c
0(s)
p0(s)
= (1  b)(⌘ + µ) + b
"Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
(⌘ + ↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ)dF ( )
+
Z 1
p(s)(µ µ)
(⌘ + µ)dF ( )
#
, (D.1)
and
@Lf
@s
= 0,
,   c
0(s)
p0(s)
= (1  b)(⌘ + µ) + b
"Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
(⌘ + ↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ)dF ( )
+
Z 1
p(s)(µ µ)
(⌘ + µ)dF ( )  ↵p(s)(µ  µ)2f(p(s)(µ  µ))
#
. (D.2)
Define the right hand side of Equation (D.1) asHSP (b), and that of Equation (D.2) asHf (b).
Clearly, the left hand sides of Equations (D.1) and (D.2) are equal. However, HSP (bSP (s)) >
Hf (bSP (s)) > Hf (bm(s)). The first inequality follows from HSP (b) > Hf (b) for any b, whereas
the second inequality is due to the fact that Hf (b) is decreasing in b.
Since c000(s) > 0 and p000(s) > 0, it is easy to see that  c0(s)/p0(s) is convex and increasing
in s, and it has the limits lims!0 c0(s)/p0(s) = 0 and lims!1 c0(s)/p0(s) = 1. As for the
right hand sides, the limits of both HSP (b) and Hf (b) are bounded away from 1 as s tends
to 1. Moreover, HSP (0) > 0, and if Hf (0) > 0, the solution to both equations exists, and
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we denote them by s⇤ and so respectively. In addition, if the solution is unique, we must have
s⇤ < so due to the fact that HSP (bSP (s)) > Hf (bm(s)).32
Using Lemma 1, if s⇤ < so, then b⇤ > bo.
E Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose s⇤ = so. If   = 1, Lemma 2 implies bm(so) > bSP (so). If   = 0, Equation (B.2)
becomes
m0(b) = p(s)(⌘   ⌘).
Comparing with Equation (B.1), bm(so) < bSP (so). Therefore, there exists   2 (0, 1) such that
bm(so) = bSP (so).
F Liability regime as the only instrument
Suppose that there exists   2 [0, 1] such that b⇤ = bo and s⇤ = so. This implies that @Lf/@b =
@LSP/@b and @Lf/@s = @LSP/@s. However, we can easily verify that these two conditions
cannot be satisfied at the same time.
G Proof of Corollary 1
The di↵erence between Equations (B.1) and (B.2) is
m0(b⇤) m0(bo) = ↵
Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
 dF ( ),
which is positive and increasing in ↵, meaning that a larger ↵ worsens overinvestment in damage
control.
Similarly, the di↵erence between Equations (D.1) and (D.2) is
(b⇤   bo)
"Z p(s)(µ µ)
0
(⌘ + ↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ)dF ( ) +
Z 1
p(s)(µ µ)
(⌘ + µ)dF ( )  (⌘ + µ)
#
  ↵b⇤p(s)(µ  µ)2f(p(s)(µ  µ)).
The first term (b⇤   bo) is positive and increasing in ↵, and the term in the square bracket is
negative and decreasing in ↵. The product of these two terms is thus negative and decreasing
↵. Since the final term  ↵b⇤p(s)(µ   µ)2f(p(s)(µ   µ)) is also negative and decreasing in ↵,
taken together the di↵erence between Equations (D.1) and (D.2) is negative and decreasing in
↵, meaning that underinvestment in attack deterrence is more severe as ↵ increases.
This proof remains valid as long as   is large enough.
32For example, there exists a unique equilibrium investment when both F (p(s)) and p(s)f(p(s)) are convex,
and m(b) is quadratic.
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H Proof of Proposition 3
First, with reimbursement, the problem for the social planner is the same as in the case with
fine. The social planner will ask the experts to take precaution if the cost of an increase in
precautionary action is less than the marginal benefit of reducing damage, i.e. when Equation
(1) is satisfied.
In the market equilibrium, when consumers are reimbursed fully for all damages, their incen-
tives to take precaution are weakened. More specifically, a consumer now takes precautionary
action if
  < (1  ⇢)p(s)(µ¯  µ).
Thus, the firm chooses s and b to minimize
min
b,s
Lfr = (1  b)p(s)(⌘ + ⇢µ)
+ b
(Z (1 ⇢)p(s)(µ µ)
0
p(s)[⌘ + ⇢(↵µ+ (1  ↵)µ)]dF ( ) +
Z 1
(1 ⇢)p(s)(µ µ)
p(s)(⌘ + ⇢µ)dF ( )
)
+m(b) + c(s), (H.1)
where subscript r denotes the case of reimbursement. The di↵erence between Equation (2) in
the main text (the case with fine) and the equation above (the case with reimbursement) lies
in the boundaries of the integrals.
The first-order condition with respect to b (when ⇢ = 1) for the firm is
m0(b) = p(s)(⌘ + µ) 
Z 1
0
p(s)(⌘ + µ)dF ( ). (H.2)
In comparison with the first-order condition with respect to b for the social planner (see Equa-
tion (B.1)), it is clear that for a given s, the marginal benefit of investing in b for the firm
is always lower than that of the social planner. Therefore, the firm underinvests in damage
control.
As for the incentive to invest in attack deterrence, the first order condition with respect to
s for the firm is
c0(s)
p0(s)
= (1  b)(⌘ + µ) + b(⌘ + µ). (H.3)
Comparing it with the first-order condition with respect to s for the social planner (see Equation
(D.1)), it is easy to see that for a given b, the right hand side of the Equation (H.3) for the firm
is always higher than that of the social planner. Using the same assumptions as in Proposition
1, the firm will overinvest in attack deterrence.
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